Analysis Of Corporate Involvement In Hoarding Cases In The Cooking Oil Market

Abstract

Corporate involvement in hoarding within the Indonesian cooking oil market has become a significant issue, attracting considerable public and governmental attention. This study aims to analyze how corporations engage in cooking oil hoarding practices and their implications for the governance of the palm oil industry in Indonesia. The results indicate that corporations often influence government policies through regulatory changes that benefit them, particularly in export activities, often without fulfilling domestic supply obligations. Corruption cases in granting export licenses demonstrate how easily corporations can influence government policy for private gain. Furthermore, weak supervision of the Crude Palm Oil (CPO) market, which tends to be oligopolistic, facilitates cartel behavior in the cooking oil market. Data transparency and strengthened law enforcement are key to effective market supervision. The identification of corporate suspects is a step forward in improving governance, but it must be followed by more decisive actions to improve the governance of the Indonesian palm oil industry, including re-imposing a moratorium on granting licenses and conducting transparent corporate audits. Structural reforms within the supply chain and the promotion of fair competition are essential to prevent future incidents of hoarding and market manipulation. The role of regulatory bodies in ensuring compliance and deterring anti-competitive practices cannot be overstated.